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Do States Respond Differently
To Changes in Monetary Policy?
Gerald A. Carlino and Robert H. DeFina
In earlier research we found that monetary
policy affects real income quite differently in each
of the eight major U.S. regions as defined by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).1 In this ar-
ticle, we extend our analysis of the effects of
monetary policy to the state level. Extending the
evidence to the state level is important for two
reasons. First, states within a region may have
quite varied responses to monetary policy ac-
tions: responses different from one another and
from the region’s overall response.  For example,
we found that five of the seven states in the Plains
region show an effect below the regional aver-
age, and two states, Missouri and  Minnesota,
show an above-average impact.  Missouri and
Minnesota account for more than one-half of the
personal income in the Plains region.
Second, a state-level study provides 48 indi-
vidual responses to monetary policy actions, not
just the eight responses in our regional study.2
*Jerry Carlino is an economic advisor in the Research
Department of the Philadelphia Fed and an adjunct pro-
fessor in the Real Estate Department of the University of
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. Bob DeFina is the John
A. Murphy Professor in the College of Commerce and
Finance, Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania.
1See the 1996 article by Gerald A. Carlino and Robert
DeFina.18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 1999
The states, therefore, provide a richer testing
ground for determining the sources of the differ-
ential responses.  Our analysis indicates that
state economies with a large proportion of the
interest-sensitive industries—construction and
durable goods manufacturing—are more re-
sponsive to changes in monetary policy than the
more industrially diverse states.  Our earlier
study showed the same is true for regional econo-
mies as well.  While our earlier analysis indi-
cated that a region’s concentration of small firms
possibly has an effect on a region’s response to
changes in policy, no such association was evi-
dent for states.  Finally, as in our regional study,
a greater concentration of small banks is found
to decrease a state’s sensitivity to monetary
policy shocks, contrary to predictions of some
economists.
WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?
Individual States’ Responses.  We used a sta-
tistical technique known as vector
autoregression (VAR) to estimate the effects of
changes in monetary policy on real personal in-
come growth at the state level.3 The variables in
our model included real personal income
growth for the state under consideration as well
as real personal income growth in each of the
eight major regions defined by the BEA.4  Includ-
ing income growth in the regions permits feed-
back effects.  The model also included the change
in the relative price of energy to account for the
effects of oil-price shocks, the change in core CPI
to capture underlying trends in the aggregate
price level, the change in the index of leading
indicators as a parsimonious way to summa-
rize a variety of macroeconomic variables, and
the change in the federal funds rate as a mea-
sure of changes in monetary policy.5 The study
employed quarterly data for the period 1958-92.
A typical way to summarize the impact of
monetary policy on personal income growth is
to show how the level of real personal income in
a state changes over time because of monetary
policy surprises, or shocks.  Such shocks are
measured by unanticipated changes in the fed-
eral funds rate. For example, in the fall of 1994,
Fed actions raised the federal funds rate 0.75
percentage point. Shortly before, forecasters had
been publicly predicting an increase of 0.25 per-
centage point. Thus, the additional 0.50 percent-
age point represented a policy shock.6  The im-
2Since Alaska and Hawaii do not share common bor-
ders with any other state, we limited our study to the 48
contiguous states.
3See Gerald Carlino and Robert DeFina (1999).  A
VAR is a widely used modeling technique for gathering
evidence on business-cycle dynamics. VARs typically rely
on a small number of variables expressed as past values
of the dependent variable and past values of the other
variables in the model.  See Theodore Crone’s article for a
discussion of VARs as applied to regional analysis.
4More precisely, we included the seven regions not
containing the state under study, plus the personal in-
come from the region containing the state less that state’s
income.
5The core CPI is the CPI minus food and energy. The
change in core CPI and the change in the index of leading
indicators are two variables that did not appear in the
list of variables for our earlier regional study.
6An important part of our study requires the separa-
tion of changes in the funds rate that are predictable
responses to important indicators of the economy’s health
from changes in the funds rate that cannot be systemati-
cally predicted (policy shocks).  The model includes an
equation that predicts changes in the federal funds rate
on the basis of a year’s worth of past data for each of the
variables in the model (including change in core CPI and
the change in the index of leading indicators). Unex-
pected changes in the federal funds rate are measured by
taking the difference between the actual and predicted
change. Unexpected changes in the federal funds rate are
used to measure monetary policy shocks in the policy
simulations that follow.  The analysis assumes that un-
expected changes in the federal funds rate arise only
from policy shocks. Some economists believe that only
unanticipated changes in monetary policy affect real eco-Intangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy? Leonard Nakamura
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pact of this unanticipated change in monetary
policy is measured by the gap between the
model’s estimate of what real personal income
in a state would have been without the mon-
etary policy action and what it turned out to be
with it.7
We found that an unexpected one-percentage-
point increase in the federal funds rate gener-
ally reduces real income growth temporarily and,
thus, leaves the level of real personal income
below what it otherwise would have been.8  The
model treats tightening and easing of the fed
funds rate symmetrically, so that an unexpected
cut in the funds rate temporarily raises real per-
sonal income growth relative to what it other-
wise would have been.
The greatest response to an unanticipated
change in monetary policy is not immediate.  In
fact, real income at the state level is essentially
unchanged for two quarters after an unantici-
pated one-percentage-point increase in the fed-
eral funds rate, but then real income declines
substantially in most states.  The maximum gap
between actual personal income and what it
would be without the change in monetary policy
occurs, on average, about eight to 10 quarters
following the policy shock. This general profile
is similar to the estimated impact of monetary
policy changes on the U.S. economy as reported
in other studies.9  If we look at real personal
income’s response to an unexpected increase of
one percentage point in the federal funds rate,
income in the nation falls 1.16 percent (compared
with what it would have been) eight quarters
after the increase (Figure).
nomic variables.  See Shaghil Ahmed’s article for a fuller
discussion of the distinction between unanticipated and
anticipated changes in monetary policy and their effects
on real activity.
7The gap in each period is called the cumulative im-
pulse response.
8The question of how monetary policy affects real
personal income in the long run remains open. We did
not conduct formal statistical tests on the significance of
the long-run response and so cannot shed light on the
issue. While the graph presented in the text suggests a
sustained impact, the effects of policy shocks over long
horizons are estimated with less statistical precision than
those estimated over short horizons. Since the estimates
become less precise, statements about policy’s long-term
impact become more tenuous.
Graph shows the percent difference in real personal
income from what it would have been without the
unanticipated increase in the fed funds rate.
National Average
9See, for example, the 1996 study by Eric Leeper,
Christopher Sims, and Tao Zha.
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While the vast majority of state responses fol-
low the general pattern demonstrated by the na-
tional average, not all states respond by the same
magnitude (see map).10  Michigan has the larg-
est response: real income fell 2.7 percent eight
quarters after a one-percentage-point increase
in the federal funds rate.  Seven states (Arizona,
Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Oregon, and Tennessee) respond at least 38 per-
cent again as much as the national average.11
Possible explanations for this high response in-
clude the fact that four of these states (Indiana,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Oregon) have
a relatively high concentration of durable goods
manufacturing, an interest-sensitive industry.
One state (Arizona) has a much higher than av-
erage concentration of construction, another in-
terest-sensitive industry.  While Georgia and
Tennessee do not have an especially high con-
centration of interest-sensitive industries, they
Response of Personal Income to a One-Percentage-Point




*Eight-quarter cumulative impulse response of personal income
10The cumulative impulse response functions for in-
dividual states are shown in our 1999 article on the
Internet at www.phil.frb.org/econ/wps/1997/wp97-
12.pdf.
11The average state response was 1.16 percent with a
standard deviation of 0.4684.  The seven most respon-
sive states are at least one standard deviation above the
average state response.
National average = -1.16Intangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy? Leonard Nakamura
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may have large markets for their products in the
states that are highly responsive to monetary
policy shocks; if so, Georgia and Tennessee
would tend to be more sensitive to monetary
policy actions than their own industrial struc-
tures would indicate.12
Seven states (Colorado, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and
Wyoming) are the least sensitive to monetary
policy shocks, responding no more than 60 per-
cent as much as the national average.13 Interest-
ingly, the total output of four of these states (Loui-
siana, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming) includes
a high concentration in the extractive industries
(drilling and mining).  Although these states are
found to be the four least sensitive to monetary
policy actions, they are buffeted by other types
of shocks, particularly shocks to the price of en-
ergy.  For example, a one-percentage-point de-
crease in the growth rate of the relative price of
energy leaves real personal income in the four
states between 1.6 percent (Oklahoma) to 3.2
percent (Wyoming) lower than otherwise after
two years.  (Personal income fell 1.9 percent in
Texas and 2.8 percent in Louisiana in response
to this energy price shock.)
By contrast, New Jersey, an energy-consum-
ing state, experiences a rise in personal income
of about 2 percent two years after a one-percent-
age-point decrease in the growth rate of the rela-
tive price of energy.  We also found that Colo-
rado, New York, and North Dakota tend to be
less responsive to monetary policy shocks than
the national average.  One reason is that pro-
duction in these states involves relatively small
shares of interest-sensitive industries.
Responses of States Within a Region. By us-
ing a weighted average of the responses of states
within a region, we can form an average re-
sponse for each of the eight major regions (Table
of Regional Summaries).  The absolute value of
these responses ranges from 0.52 in the South-
west to 1.72 in the Great Lakes; in terms of abso-
lute value the national average is 1.16.14
Comparisons of states’ responses to monetary
policy actions reveal that an individual state’s
response is often quite different from the aver-
age response of its region and from the response
of the other states in that region.  For example,
12Since we used broad regional aggregates to capture
these spillovers in our model, we are unable to shed any
light on the extent to which trade among individual states
influences their responsiveness to monetary policy ac-
tions.
13States were placed in this grouping if their policy
response was at least one standard deviation below that
of the average state.
Table of
Regional Summaries
               Region  Average
Response*
New England  -1.26
Mideast  -0.91




Rocky Mountain  -0.80
Far West  -1.16
All Regions  -1.16
*Eight-quarter cumulative impulse response of real
personal income. The regional responses are com-
puted as weighted averages of the individual state
responses; the weights reflect each state’s share of
its region’s personal income.
14Real personal income growth in the Rocky Moun-
tain region also has a relatively small response to mon-
etary policy shocks. Thus, our findings match up well
relative to those reported in our earlier article, which
found the largest response to monetary policy actions in
the Great Lakes region and the least response in the South-
west and Rocky Mountain regions.
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we found that real personal income in the Far
West region fell 1.16 percentage points follow-
ing a one-percentage-point increase in the fed
funds rate, matching the average national re-
sponse.  However, two of the four states that make
up the Far West region (Oregon and Nevada) are
considerably more responsive to monetary policy
shocks.
Being part of a region that has a low response
to monetary policy actions is no guarantee that
each state in the region will respond similarly.
Arizona responds more than half again as much
as the U.S. average, despite being part of the least
responsive Southwest region.  In general, there
is much less variation in regional responses to
monetary policy shocks than in state responses.15
WHAT CAUSES THE DIFFERENTIAL
STATE RESPONSES TO MONETARY
POLICY ACTIONS?
In our regional study, we showed that a
region’s response to monetary policy is related
to its mix of interest-sensitive industries and
possibly to its mix of large and small firms. Be-
cause small businesses typically have banks as
their sole sources of credit they might be consid-
ered more sensitive to Fed policy. Our regional
study found only slight evidence that economic
activity in regions that have high concentrations
of small firms was more sensitive to changes in
Fed policy.  Similarly, some researchers believe
that the effects of monetary policy would be
greater in regions with a large share of small
banks. But our regional study found that the mix
of small and large banks has the opposite effect.
In another recent study, we looked at how im-
portant these factors are in accounting for the
different state responses to monetary policy
shocks (Appendix).16 The individual state re-
sponses (the estimated values of the cumulative
responses shown on the map) were systemati-
cally related to variables capturing two of these
three factors.
The interest sensitivity of a state’s industries
is likely to rise with the percent of a state’s total
gross state product accounted for by construc-
tion or durable goods manufacturing. Studies
have shown that consumer spending on hous-
ing and manufactured goods, especially durable
goods, tends to be interest sensitive.  Spending
on services, in contrast, tends to vary little with
interest rates.17 Our analysis indicates that state
economies with a large proportion of construc-
tion or manufacturing of durable goods are more
responsive to changes in monetary policy than
the more industrially diverse states.
On the other hand,  the analysis found that
states with relatively large shares of output ac-
counted for by the extractive industries and by
the finance, insurance, and real estate industries
are less sensitive to changes in monetary policy
than the more industrially diverse states. This
finding suggests that differences in interest-rate
sensitivities across industries are one reason for
different state responses.18  Differences in the mix
of interest-sensitive industries may explain why
the states that make up the Third Federal Re-
serve District (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Delaware) respond somewhat more to monetary
policy shocks than other states in the Mideast
region. (See Monetary Policy and the Third District
States.)
15The standard deviation of the regional responses is
0.3574; state responses show a considerably larger stan-
dard deviation of 0.4684.
16See Gerald A. Carlino and Robert DeFina (1998b).
17See Paul Bennett’s article for a survey of relevant
studies.
18The finding of high interest-rate sensitivity for states
that depend heavily on durable goods manufacturing is
consistent with our findings for regions. However, unlike
the state-level findings, our regional results did not offer
significant evidence that regions that depend on the con-
struction industry have greater responsiveness to mon-
etary policy initiatives.  The state-level findings are likely
to be more reliable, since they are based on a much larger
sample.Intangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy? Leonard Nakamura
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Monetary Policy and the Third District States
The responses of the states of the Third Federal Reserve District to monetary policy shocks are
similar to one another and to the national average response.a  The states of the Third District have a
somewhat stronger response, however, than the other two states in the Mideast region—Maryland
and New York. This stronger response can be attributed, at least in part, to differences in the mix of
interest-sensitive industries.  For example, New York has a much higher concentration of finance,
insurance, and real estate industries (24.3 percent) compared with the average state (14.9 percent),
which tends to reduce New York’s responsiveness (see the Table).  Also limiting New York’s respon-
siveness is its relatively low fraction of construction and durable goods manufacturing.
Share of Total Output Attributable
To Selected Interest-Sensitive Industriesb
State Construction Durable Finance, Policy
Goods Insurance, Responsec
and Real Estate
Delaware 5.0 9.8 19.8 -1.00
Maryland 5.9 7.1 18.1 -0.92
New Jersey 4.4 9.6 18.4 -1.06
New York 3.4 9.4 24.3 -0.72
Pennsylvania 4.5 14.8 15.6 -1.14
U.S. Average 4.7 11.5 14.9 -1.16
While Maryland has a somewhat higher share of interest-sensitive construction, Maryland’s re-
sponsiveness tends to be limited by its relatively low share of interest-sensitive durable goods manu-
facturing and its relatively high concentration of income from the finance, insurance, and real estate
sector. By contrast, Pennsylvania has a relatively high share of durable goods manufacturing and
only a slightly above-average share of income from the finance, insurance, and real estate sector.
Thus, among the states of the Mideast region, Pennsylvania tends to be the most responsive to
monetary policy actions.
Because the policy responses (impulse responses) were estimated over a long period, the industry
mix variables given in the table are averaged over 1977-90. However, states have experienced changes
in their mix of industries over time, so that long-run averages may not be representative of a state’s
current industrial structure.  Therefore, we also looked at the 1996 share of each state’s personal
income accounted for by the industries given in the table and found that conclusions based on 1996
shares are consistent with those based on shares averaged over the period 1977-90.
aThe Third District covers the eastern two-thirds of Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and Delaware.
bShares are averaged over the period 1977-90.
cEight-quarter cumulative impulse response in real personal income that results from an unanticipated
one-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate.
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At the state level we find no evidence that
states containing a larger concentration of small
firms tend to be more responsive to monetary
policy shifts than states containing small con-
centrations of small firms.19  In addition, we
found that a region becomes less sensitive to an
increase in the federal funds rate as the percent-
age of small banks in that region increases.  This
result is inconsistent with the view espoused by
Anil Kashyap and Jeremy Stein that small banks
do not have as many alternative sources of funds
and are therefore affected more by changes in
monetary policy.20 One possibility for the incon-
sistency is that a bank’s asset size may be a poor
indicator of its ability to adjust its balance sheet
to monetary policy actions.  In a study at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Joe Peek and
Eric Rosengren suggested that bank capital is a
better indicator—better capitalized banks have
more and cheaper alternative sources of funds
available.  Using data for New England banks
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the au-
thors found that the number of loans made by
banks that were under regulatory pressure to
raise their capital levels did not increase in re-
sponse to a lower federal funds rate.
CONCLUSION
Does monetary policy have differential effects
across states? The answer clearly is yes. Com-
parisons of states’ responses to monetary policy
actions reveal that an individual state’s response
is often quite different from the average response
of its region and from the response of the other
states in that region.
We provided some reasons for the differential
policy response across states.  The size of a state’s
response to a monetary policy shock is positively
related to its share of construction and durable
goods manufacturing and negatively related to
its share of extractive industries and the finance,
insurance, and real estate industries.  A state’s
concentration of small firms has no significant
effect on the size of the state’s policy response.
Finally, a greater concentration of small banks
decreases a state’s sensitivity to monetary policy
shocks, contrary to the predictions of Kashyap
and Stein.
19According to one theory, Fed actions affect economic
activity by altering banks’ ability to provide loans. Large
firms usually have greater access to alternative, nonbank
sources of funds, such as issuing corporate stocks and
bonds or commercial paper. We found no evidence, how-
ever, that activity in states that have high concentrations
of small firms was especially sensitive to changes in Fed
policy.
20This contrary effect was also found in our regional
study.
Appendix
The absolute value of the estimated state cumulative responses shown in Table A (and summarized
in the map) are used as dependent variables in a cross-state regression equation to explain the
differential state responses to monetary policy shocks. An eight-quarter horizon was chosen for the
cumulative response because this is generally when Fed policy has its maximum cumulative impact.
The independent variables in the model are designed to account for the three reasons given to explain
why state responses to monetary policy innovations differ.  The shares of a state’s gross state product
(GSP) accounted for by each of eight major industry groupings are included to capture the effect of
monetary policy as a result of the policy’s effect on interest rates.  The percent of a state’s firms
(establishments) that are small, defined as the percent of a state’s firms with fewer than 250 employ-
ees, is included to capture the possible effects of firm size. Two alternative variables are used to
capture the effects of bank size—the percent of a state’s total loans made by the state’s banks at orIntangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy? Leonard Nakamura
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TABLE A
Eight-Quarter Cumulative Responses to a One-Percentage-Point Fed Funds Rate Increase
(response in percentage points; weight is the state’s share of regional personal income.)
New England Response Weight Southeast Response Weight
Connecticut 1.2678 0.29 Alabama 1.3261 0.07
Massachusetts 1.0712 0.47 Arkansas 1.3443 0.04
Maine 1.5099 0.07 Florida 1.154 0.22
New Hampshire 1.9264 0.07 Georgia 1.6084 0.11
Rhode Island 1.4391 0.07 Kentucky 1.1599 0.06
Vermont 1.4246 0.03 Louisiana 0.4935 0.07
Mississippi 1.3004 0.04
Mideast Response Weight North Carolina 1.3404 0.11
Delaware 1.0018 0.01 South Carolina 1.2816 0.05
Maryland 0.9174 0.10 Tennessee 1.5632 0.08
New Jersey 1.0607 0.20 Virginia 1.022 0.12
New York 0.7176 0.44 West Virginia 1.3803 0.03
Pennsylvania 1.1379 0.25
Southwest Response Weight
Great Lakes Response Weight Arizona 1.8006 0.13
Illinois 1.2351 0.30 New Mexico 0.8182 0.05
Indiana 1.8345 0.12 Oklahoma -0.0741 0.13
Michigan 2.6634 0.22 Texas 0.361 0.69
Ohio 1.5378 0.25
Wisconsin 1.4604 0.11 Rocky Mountain Response Weight
Colorado 0.7134 0.50
Plains Response Weight Idaho 0.9573 0.13
Iowa 0.8278 0.16 Montana 0.8469 0.11
Kansas 0.9653 0.14 Utah 1.1396 0.19
Minnesota 1.1982 0.25 Wyoming 0.1109 0.07
Missouri 1.5282 0.29
Nebraska 0.8216 0.09 Far West Response Weight
North Dakota 0.7427 0.03 California 1.1305 0.79




below the 90th percentile in assets nationally, and the percent of a state’s total loans made by the state’s
banks at or below the 90th percentile in assets nationally and not part of a bank holding company.
Because the estimated long-run responses represent average behavior during the sample period,
averaging the data for the explanatory variables is appropriate.  Averaging also minimizes the chance
that the results depend on the data for a particular year and helps control for business-cycle dynamics.
(Data availability limited averaging to the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.)
Two versions of the model are presented in Table B, depending on which of the alternative small-
bank variables is used. In model 1, the all-small-banks variable is included, whereas model 2 uses only
small banks that are not members of a bank holding company. The results for models 1 and 2 pre-
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sented in Table B explain be-
tween 61 to 62 percent of the
cross-state variation in cumu-
lative responses. The percent of
a state’s GSP accounted for by
the manufacture of durable
goods and by construction is
positively and significantly re-
lated to the size of a state’s long-
run response to Fed policy
shocks; the percent of a state’s
GSP accounted for by its extrac-
tive industries and by the fi-
nance, insurance, and real es-
tate industries is negatively and
significantly related to its long-
run response to Fed policy.
These results appear quite rea-
sonable and do not depend on
the choice of the loan variable.
The importance of the shares
of durable goods manufactur-
ing and construction can be in-
terpreted as evidence that
monetary policy affects total
output because higher interest
rates are likely to have pro-
found effects on people’s abil-
ity to buy houses and other big
ticket items, such as autos.
We find no evidence that
cross-state variation in the mix
of small versus large firms mat-
ters. States containing large
concentrations of small firms
tend to be no more responsive
to monetary policy shifts than
states containing small concen-
trations of small firms.  In con-
trast, we find some evidence
that a state becomes more sen-
sitive to a monetary policy
shock as the percentage of
small banks in the state goes
down. The estimated coeffi-
cients on the small-bank vari-
ables are negative in both mod-
els 1 and 2 and negative and sig-




Variableb Model 1 Model 2
Intercept  0.2179 0.3194
(1.5218) (1.4867)
% Agriculture -0.5071 -0.3359
(1.4005) (1.3818)
% Mining -3.4785 -3.2890
(1.7354)** (1.7157)*
%  Construction 20.9681 19.5034
(8.2570)** (8.1240)**
% Durables Mfg.  5.5628 5.5225
(1.4791)*** (1.4374)***
% Nondurable Mfg. -0.1964 -0.0639
(1.5781) (1.5585)
% Transportation 3.4391 3.3139
(4.4016) (4.2550)
% Wholesale Trade -0.6849 -0.3864
(4.9399) (4.8691)
% Retail Trade -3.0018 -1.6932
(7.6550) (7.5837)
% FIRE -5.0091 -5.2696
(2.7362)* (2.7047)*
% Small Firm 0.0064 0.0047
(0.0109) (0.0107)
% Small  Bank  Loans -0.0044
 (all banks)  (0.0031)
% Small  Bank Loans -0.0076
(no holding co.) (0.0042)*
Adjusted R2 0.6070 0.6191
aThe dependent variable is the absolute value of the esti-
mated state cumulative responses shown in the table. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate that a null
hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
bVariables are averaged over 1977-90.Intangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy? Leonard Nakamura
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